Discussion #1:
What we can say about the youth, specifically, as agents of protest is that they are innovative and when mobilized, can make a change in MENA politics. I will use the case of Egypt's youth as Bayat details, to support this. As Egypt urbanized and globalization took place, new politics and youth involvement emerged and shifted the political and societal state of Egypt. Previously, the youth were demobilized in politics and did not trust party politics. They did not vote or trust electoral games which only further pushed them away from being involved in politics. There was a dominant political and moral authority that limited individuality or any new developments that the youth brings about. Hence, the youth in Egypt had to assert their identity through accommodating innovation where they took traditions and reinvented them in a way that catered to their interests. While this social pursuit did not revolutionize their political mobilization, it did set the scene for the youth to garner the courage and voice to represent their identity without the consequences of the violation of political and moral authority as they gathered over shared ideas within their limits. What shifted the Egyptian political arena and the youth's involvement was the formation of youth-initiated civic organizations, which promoted "voluntarism, cultural tolerance, development work, employment, education, and poverty reduction" (Bayat, 127). The youth mobilized and created a new method of practicing politics in the process by utilizing technology such as radio, websites, and computers. They even gathered to produce the April 6 Youth Movement which advocated against economic stagnation and political repression. The regimes of the Middle East ended up being limited in their ability to repress the youth identity, making youth movements consist of a "transformative and democratizing promise" (Bayat, 128). Hence, through the innovative nature of the youth, their mobilization in social justice and political involvement produced a whole new form of politics that changed their stance and value in the MENA political scene.
Discussion #2:
Asef Bayat's "Revolution Without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring" is a book that details the challenges and tests that shuras faced after the Iranian revolution. After reading, I find that it is disheartening to see the decrease of shuras which have served as support for democracy and worker empowerment in the industrial scene. Moreover, the government's aim to insert Islamic beliefs into the workplace, which did seem to have the intention of creating unity at first, has later been shown to have created divisions within the workplace and society instead. In addition, the text continues to shed light on the inherent contradiction that shuras face since they have been shown to lack managerial knowledge which in turn posed an obstacle to their functionality. The global view that is mentioned in the text also presents a dark view as it portrays the gradual loss of power and significance of worker-centric movements globally because of the dominance of neoliberal policies that favor market forces and individualism over community and equality. The chapter provides both a profound insight into the complex dynamics of revolutionary movements resulting from economic and political causes and a reminder of the unexpected and unfulfilled promises and challenges that such movements usually face. It encourages modern societies to reflect deeply on historical lessons to make way for more democratic and inclusive futures, emphasizing the resilience of the revolutionary spirit through struggles and unfulfilled dreams.
Discussion #3:
While resistance and rebellion both include methods of opposition to the government, the way they are carried out, their goals, and their intensity differ. Resistance alludes to what is usually nonviolent acts such as peaceful protests or civil disobedience, that oppose a form of authority while rebellions tend to be more violent and organized such as armed conflict to overthrow the government. Resistances usually have smaller groups of people while rebellions are larger. Resistance targets specific issues while rebellions aim to overthrow and are less structured. Rebellion is generally more intense and contains a higher degree of confrontation than resistance.
Rebellions and revolutions also differ in the sense that while they both oppose the government as well, revolutions are larger in scale and have a bigger aim which is to transform society, not only overthrow the government while rebellions are more limited in their goals in that they mainly aim to overthrow the government and do not aim for societal changes. Revolutions also consist of a variety of methods such as mass protests and armed conflict while rebellions also include armed conflict but also are more violent and utilize destruction. All in all, revolutions usually have a more lasting effect on society since they change its norms, values, traditions, and the economic and political state, while rebellions produce more limited changes such as the change of government.
Discussion #4:
One of the triggers of rebellion of Southeast Asia that is covered in my chapter stems from the Green Revolution and the dire economic conditions that have intensified in certain areas. The Green Revolution was an era of transformation into using technology to increase crop yields and agricultural production. Farmers started to incorporate new technologies such as high-yielding varieties of cereals and adopt new methods of cultivation which aimed to replace traditional agricultural technology. The ratio of population to land has become increasingly unfavorable, asserting the dominance of rent and tax collectors. The proportion of rural landless, who have the most insecure position, has steadily grown. The returns to the owners of factors of production, land and capital, have increased while the returns to the abundant factor, labor, have decreased. The high unemployment rates and lack of urban job formation make the Green Revolution and its high-yielding varieties and new methods of cultivation a threat to the poorer section of peasants. Out of these conditions have come major class conflicts and postwar agrarian rebellions in countries like Burma, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
In the context of the peasant's rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia, the moral economy of the peasant revolves around their subsistence needs and the obstacles they face in ensuring their survival. From the context, it can be inferred that while the moral economy focuses on the subsistence and survival needs of the peasants, the political economy might be more concerned with the broader economic and political structures in place. That is one way of differentiating them in the context of Southeast Asia. As for the failure of rebellions, with the exception of Vietnam, major postwar agrarian rebellions, despite being larger in scale and better organized than their prewar counterparts, were crushed. This indicates the strength of modern states in suppressing such rebellions and rebellions' tendency to fail against modern states.
Discussion #5:
I believe rebellions are generally triggered by many things such as oppression, injustice, economic instability, class conflicts, and political or social repression. It relates to everyday resistance in the sense that rebellions represent a more collective and confrontational form of resistance; however, resistances are the foundation upon which rebellions build on and emerge. Solidarities are the glue that holds collective action together. It is what is needed for it to mobilize, especially if it is a violent and risky action. The solidarities that allow for this mobilization come in shared ideas, identities, issues, and mutual trust which fosters a common goal among people and encourages them to overcome the fear of those risks and violence and collectively act against oppression or other injustices. These solidarities can be understood in terms of a moral economy since they are derived from the shared norms, values, and perceptions of injustice with the goal of a more equal society, and the whole concept of a moral economy is about these shared norms and beliefs that decide what is perceived as fair in a society and its economic structure. I would say that there is a political economy of rebellions as well since there is this interchange between the political and economic structure and the urge to social action in the emergence and advancement of rebellions. It is the economic and political inequalities that bring out social mobilization and shape rebellions and their effects. The aims of the rebels can range from social justice to economic equality and their success relies on the achievement of their goals and their ability to produce a change in the political, social, or economic scene. I think that every rebellion can be considered somewhat successful since it makes certain voices heard, and if their goal is not achieved within the short run, there is still the concept of failing yet still contributing to long-term change and the instigation of a pursuit of justice. All changes must begin somewhere and it is not easy to achieve from the first time or within a short period of time, especially if the injustice has been ingrained in the system for a long time.
Discussion #6:
The difference between a revolution and a rebellion varies across structure, size, and cause. Revolutions represent a maintained change in political, economic, and social systems since they consist of a wider scope and aim for a full transformation of whatever the existing system is. One example would be the Russian Revolution of 1917 which did not stop at overthrowing the Tsarist regime but aimed to alter the entire structure and values of Russian society. In comparison, a rebellion is usually violent or comes in the form of open resistance to an authority. It is usually localized, making the scope more narrow, and does not aim to transform an entire structure. They just aim to solve specific issues rather than change an entire system.
The importance of figures like Lenin and Trotsky in revolutions comes from what they offer to revolutions. Lenin and Trotsky were leaders who created a vision and strategy for the goals of the masses. They were able to form a logical and consistent program for these goals. They also played a central role in mobilizing support and getting many factions to unite under a common goal, only strengthening the revolution. They were also representatives of the party's goals and ideals as they were the face of the movement and excelled in making decisions. For example, Lenin played an important role in the Bolshevik Party as he was essential in making decisions relating to their policies and tactics.
The relationship between the rural and urban Masses and the revolutionary party and leadership can be best portrayed using the Russian Revolution. At first, the Bolsheviks were mostly supported by the urban workers, however, what proved to be more important was the support of rural peasants since they made up a substantial majority of the Russian population. Leadership usually has to manage the various different interests of these factions. An example of this would be when the Bolsheviks promised "Land, Peace, and Bread," which satisfies both urban and rural interests. The leadership had to take both interests in mind to maintain support among both groups. This did not seem to be easy since their interests can also vary greatly. Urban workers focused on problems concerning them such as wages and working conditions while the rural peasants focused on problems such as local authority and the distribution of land.
I believe that there can be forms of everyday resistance within a revolutionary movement, for even within revolutions, there can be internal conflict or differences of opinion that lead to some sort of resistance whether it be the belief of different ideologies or the application of different strategies yet still under the same cause. Fitzpatrick's detailings of the daily lives of the Soviets depict how they resisted some state policies and orders subtly which can be understood as everyday resistance within the wider revolution.
Discussion #7:
1-Who responded favorably to Mao's call for a Cultural Revolution? Why?
The main response to Mao's call for a Cultural Revolution came from the urban group of young people, the Red Guards. They responded because they supported the vision Mao had for revolution and the elimination of capitalist aspects of society. They also wanted to garner opportunities for themselves as the youth and increase their status by portraying how they could be politically involved and revolutionary because they were not very involved before and one's social status depended on lineage. They wanted to change that. In addition, the social norm at that time was to be a part of the Red Guards and assist the Cultural Revolution since that was what was deemed as right among the youth.
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2-What did Chinese youth aspire for? To what extent did their aspirations match the regime's agendas?
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The Chinese youth had various different aspirations; some aspired to produce a fully socialist society that diminished any traces of capitalistic or traditional aspects, and those were who believed in Maoist ideology. Some genuinely believed in Maoist ideology and wanted to create a truly socialist society free from any capitalist or traditional remnants. Others aspired for power, status, or other personal benefits that could come from being active politically. I think that their aspirations did match the regime's agendas with some, that is not the case with the Red Guards as the Cultural Revolution progressed. Mao's regime aimed to assert Mao's authority and produce a society that was consistently under revolution, but the internal factions and disorder within the Red Guards became an issue and did not align with the regime's agendas.
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3-Is it possible for ordinary men and women to engage in everyday resistance or weapons of the weak under a communist revolutionary dictatorship? Why or why not?
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I think so because even under oppressive regimes, ordinary men and women usually find methods of resistance whether it be public or private. Just like what we learned from Scott's concept of "everyday resistance" or "weapons of the weak," people can perform subtle types of resistance whether it be through word of mouth, slow work, or passive non-compliance. In the case of Maoist China, although surveillance was intense and the people were instilled with fear, they still performed some sort of resistance whether it be through literature or private condemnation of policies or maintenance of certain traditions.
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4- What are the legacies of the Cultural Revolution for dissent and freedom in the PRC?
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The Cultural Revolution has many legacies. First, The Chinese Communist Party became more cautious of radical mass movements and factionalism. Dissent was suppressed since the revolution led to a stronger security structure in the PRC and more caution towards any type of dissent since they did not want it to escalate. It is also a matter that led the Chinese to be cautious of radical beliefs and paved the way for more practical approaches to politics.
Discussion #8:
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I think Kamrava identifies the core elements of any theory of revolution by highlighting the importance of structural circumstances such as inefficiencies of the state or economic imbalances and agency such as group or individual acts. He does, however, note that revolutions have an unpredictable nature and that there are unforeseen factors.
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I think that Kamrava agreed with Fitzpatrick and Wu to the extent that he also sees the planned nature of the Russian and Chinese revolutions, however, he also stresses the role of contingent events and unforeseen elements in affecting their outcomes.
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While planned revolutions have a guiding ideology and often a central authority driving the change like the Bolsheviks in Russia, spontaneous revolutions happen more naturally from widespread societal discontent, often without a clear leader or structure at the outset. Planned revolutions result in ideological aims matching the outcome while unplanned revolutions result in outcomes that do not match the original ideals, vage promises that are not kept, ni planned initiatives or goals, heavier involvement of state involvement in civilians life, and rapid state institution production.
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According to Kamrava, post-revolutionary states often undergo periods of consolidation and reorganization. They may introduce radical reforms, as seen with the USSR's NEP and Five-Year Plans. However, they can also experience periods of intense internal conflict, as was the case during China's Cultural Revolution, where there was a purge of perceived counter-revolutionaries, showcasing the revolution's tendency to "devour its own children." Also, the nature of the post revolutionary state relies on whether the revolution was planned or unplanned since the outcomes will differ with their tendency to match ideological aims.
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Kamrava delves into the complexity of gauging a revolution's success. It isn't just about regime survival but also about the revolution's ability to achieve its ideological aims. Some revolutions may install long-lasting regimes but fail in their broader goals, while others might bring about substantive societal change but falter in state-building. Hence, their success depends on the ability to establish political institutions that operate and united them in relation to social groups. Another symbol of success is when the promoted political views are turned into actually political arrangements that are applied. On the question of whether revolutions are doomed to fail, Kamrava suggests that while many revolutions face significant challenges, it's reductive to label them categorically as successes or failures. Each revolution has its own context and legacy.
Discussion #9:
1) What kind of mass support existed for insurgents? What about support for the state in the civil war? And lastly, could you be a neutral fencesitter?
The mass support for the insurgents in El Salvador's civil war came from a long history of repression and injustice that many experienced. Many campesinos witnessed suffering and violence caused by the state. They sympathized with the victims, making them feel morally outraged which only enlarged their support and desire to join the insurgency as a form of resistance. Their support was reliant on their maintenance of dignity and fighting oppression, and the chances of the success of these insurgent acts were not their priority. The insurgents were supported by various segments of the population, including landless laborers, land-poor peasants, some smallholders, and even some beneficiaries of counterinsurgency agrarian reform. Campesinos expressed a strong aspiration for land and resentment at its unjust distribution. Many campesinos experienced extreme poverty and saw the insurgency as a means to address their land-related grievances. The FMLN provided a platform for campesinos to mobilize and advocate for their rights. The insurgency offered a chance for campesinos to challenge the existing power structures and demand land reform. These groups provided the insurgents with food, water, and military intelligence; some served as militia members and leaders of insurgent cooperatives.
The support for the state was from the U.S. under the excuse of fighting communism because one of the 5 guerrillas was communist and to restore order. As part of its conditions for extending military assistance to the regime, the United States insisted that the Christian Democratic Party be brought into the government and that agrarian reform be carried out and competitive elections held. Even hard-line leaders of the military recognized the usefulness of the international legitimacy to be gained by governing in a broader coalition Others who supported the state came from those who experienced significant violence from the insurgents themselves, as evidenced by the southern cantons of Tenancingo, which supported the government.
Regarding the possibility of being a neutral "fencesitter," during periods of extreme state violence, some residents retreated with the FMLN for short-term protection but did not necessarily continue to support the FMLN. The FMLN did not specifically protect particular households or communities, suggesting that while there was support for both the insurgency and the state, neutrality may have been difficult due to the coercive nature of the conflict. This complexity suggests that while outright neutrality may have been an option for some, the conflict dynamics usually forced individuals to align with one side or the other, whether out of ideological commitment, coercion, or practical necessity. Neutrality was not a simple option, especially during periods of extreme violence. Proximity to insurgent forces and past local state violence were critical factors that shaped who acted in support of the insurgents. Even those who felt moral outrage did not support the insurgents if they were not close to them, indicating that taking a neutral stance could be a result of both choice and circumstance.
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2) How does the author's fieldwork methodology lead her to her conclusions about people's agency and participation in the insurgency? How might her approach be different from social historians we read earlier?
The author's fieldwork methodology involved in-depth interviews, participation in meetings, and informal interactions, which provided insights into the reasons behind people's agency and participation in the insurgency. This approach differs from that of some social historians in that it does not solely rely on historical documents or second-hand accounts but directly engages with the individuals who experienced the events. It allowed the author to understand the emotional and moral dimensions of participation, such as pride, joy, and defiance, which are not easily captured through traditional historical methods.
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3) What made leftist insurgents enter into negotiations with the state at the end of the armed conflict?
The factors that led leftist insurgents to enter negotiations with the state at the end of the armed conflict are not detailed in the provided excerpts. However, such decisions are typically influenced by a combination of strategic, political, and military considerations, including the sustainability of the conflict, international pressure, shifts in public support, and a reassessment of the goals and possibilities of achieving them through continued armed struggle or political means.
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4) Do economic grievances suffice as an explanation of insurgent politics? Why or why not?
Economic grievances alone do not suffice as an explanation of insurgent politics. While they can be a significant motivating factor, the Salvadoran case shows that emotional and moral reasons, such as defiance and the pleasure derived from agency and authorship of collective actions, also play vital roles. Insurgent participation was a complex phenomenon influenced by personal experiences of violence, local histories, moral outrage, and the development of a sense of agency that gave individuals a stake in the outcomes of their collective actions.
Discussion #10:
1) Which of the concepts we have discussed so far (resistance, rebellion, revolution) does A's tricksterism come closest to? Or is it something altogether new and different? Explain your reasoning.
Anonymous' tricksterism, as discussed by Coleman, comes close to elements of resistance, rebellion, and revolution, yet it also possesses unique characteristics that also make it something new and different at the same time. As we have learned throughout this course, resistance usually involves pushing back against authority without necessarily aiming to overthrow it, get violent, or cause great social change. Resistances can be subtle forms of covert acts that defy a certain authority. Rebellion and revolution consist of more direct and aggressive attempts to change the entire existing authority or system. Where Anonymous' actions come close is when they often start as resistance, using humor and disruption as tools. Anonymous’ activities such as digital protests, hacks, and information leaks, certainly align with being a resistance, considering that these acts are simply a form of digital resistance that challenges authority without the pursuit of overthrowing institutions. However, their acts can also escalate to rebellion, especially when they target specific organizations or systems. However, their decentralized nature where they have no specific leadership and lack of a clear, unified ideology make them different from the traditional understanding of revolution. Revolutions are of a wider range and aim for the overthrow of authority or systemic change, and again, Anonymous' decentralized, fluid nature, and the diversity of issues they address, make their activities less close to the foundational aspects of revolution. Anonymous' tricksterism could be seen as a new form of digital activism that offers something unique in its characteristic of being decentralized with no central leadership or organization, which is the norm for resistance, rebellion, and revolution. They are also not easily classified since they all operate anonymously, creating a fluid collective identity, and their choice of using the digital scene as their battlefield is also unique in itself as it presents a new arena for resistance. They also tackle many issues and a diverse range at that which is also a newfound ability that was not as easy or widespread in traditional forms of resistance.
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2) How are the strategies and tactics of Anonymous hackers different from those of, say, Wikileaks or Al Qaeda? Of these "global security threats," which do you see as most threatening to states today, and why?
Anonymous differs from groups like WikiLeaks or Al Qaeda in their methods and goals. WikiLeaks focuses on the disclosure of classified information through secure and anonymous drop sites, making transparency their form of activism. Al Qaeda uses violence and terror to achieve its goals. Unlike them, Anonymous usually uses digital disruptions like distributed denial of service attacks, hacking, and public shaming campaigns, focusing more on making a statement or protest rather than physical violence or systematic information exposure. In terms of threat to states, I think, as you have quoted, " it depends," on the perspective and the specific context. Groups like Al Qaeda pose a direct physical threat, while Anonymous and WikiLeaks challenge state control over information and narratives, so it could be a matter of which the state views as bigger damage.
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3) Why do humor "(lulz") and enjoyment ("fun") matter to the politics of Anonymous online? Might we bring to our analysis what the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga as something innate in human nature, our playfulness and inventiveness even in serious situations (he called it "homo ludens")?
The use of humor and enjoyment or "lulz" and "fun" in Anonymous' activities is critical as it serves many purposes. It can be a tool for coping with the risks involved in their activities which is a way to attract and retain participants, and a method to disarm and ridicule their targets. As we have learned in class, charisma is also a large factor in getting people to follow, and the use of humor may add to the general opinion of Anonymous and the desire to follow them. This playfulness, as noted by Johan Huizinga, reflects a fundamental human instinct to find joy and creativity even in serious or dire situations. I think it's an important, if not the most important, component of Anonymous' identity and appeal, blurring the lines between activism and entertainment.
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4) If Anonymous moves from tricksterism to political violence, is this akin to the shift from resistance to rebellion that we discussed in September? Think of various uncomfortable examples from ISIS to Proud Boys on the dark web who may be implicated in this turn to violence.
I think if Anonymous were to move from digital tricksterism to political violence, it would represent a significant shift akin to moving from resistance to rebellion. The use of violence alters the nature of any movement, often leading to more severe repercussions and changing public perception. This shift is not just tactical but also ideological. It's important to distinguish between the actions of individual members and the group as a whole, especially in a loosely organized collective like Anonymous. Groups on the dark web, like ISIS or Proud Boys, who engage in or advocate for violence, represent a more radical and dangerous turn, significantly different from the non-violent tricksterism of early Anonymous activities.
Discussion #11:
1) I think that digital platforms affect social movements and political activism greatly in terms of allowing a fast and wide spread of information and coordination globally. As discussed, the Palestinian resistance has gone beyond Palestine. They enable the creation of a hybrid political reality where both the traditional and online forms of activism unite, and this is apparent in both Anonymous and the Arab Spring, and we can see that digital activism has surpassed the traditional form since it instigated collective action and mobilization while also posing as a form of resistance that is harder to censor or shut down.
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2) The aspects of the Tunisian political system and the Ben Ali regime that made it an unlikely poster child of the Arab Spring is that it consisted of authoritarianism, political repression, and media censorship which does not help the cause of the Arab Spring. Although, there was the fabricated image of Tunisia being a democratic, liberal, and human rights promoter, that was not the real case. Yet, with all this, we cannot say it is a complete outlier in MENA politics due to its highly educated and strong civil society along with its small size as a country which makes it a one-of-a-kind contribution to MENA politics where it emerged from regional stereotypes because of these characteristics.
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3) I think we can say that the Tunisian uprising can be deemed as revolutionary because of its great political change, but there are elements of resistance and rebellion that rise against certain economic and social grievances. All in all, there was a systemic shift from authoritarianism to a more democratic society, yet under all of this, there was a brewing public dissent and strong demands for change.
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4) The triggers for a nationwide regime change in Tunisia encompass economic issues such as unemployment along with political and social injustice.: The primary triggers included economic struggles, high unemployment, political corruption, and social injustice. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi acted as a catalyst. Ben Ali's insistence on holding on to power even while past his terms could be considered a trigger. There are many unjust occurrences or vast demonstrations that shift the attitude completely. These triggers, in light of past readings, represent a culmination of long-standing frustrations and a failure of the authoritarian regime to address basic needs and rights. In addition, there is always a highly effective and dramatic events whether it be the death of someone or the complete collapse of something that spark movements.
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5) While strategic rationality plays an important role in coordinating social movements, emotions and passions are also just as equally important since they spark participation and commitment and stem feelings of grievance for a long time which only motivates them further. However, a balance between the two is also important since any extremities of either side would cause failure. If there is too much emotion, that can cause an unorganized or irrational form of movements, yet to rely on rationality also poses an issue since there may be a lack of motivation or commitment. Successful movements do need that "Goldilocks-style" balance to use the best of both worlds, utilizing emotions and rationality to encourage activity but in the direction of implementing feasible acts in the process.
Discussion #12:
1) Affective publics refer to publics that are formed when connected or mobilized through the expression of emotions or sentiment. These are publics that were created by the interaction of people, technology, and practices. Affective publics are also known for their creation around affective intensity which only serves the purpose of raising awareness of certain issues, yet it may not strengthen the comprehension of these issues or any actual civic engagement. These affective publics are effective in terms of emotion, intensity, or opinion instead of logic.
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2) In movements like the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street, sentiment analysis is very important for understanding the affective nature of digital communication. These movements consist of a combination of emotions, drama, news, and intensity. The streams on social platforms like Twitter supported an affectively motivated type of news, reflecting the collective sentiment of those who engaged in it. This sentiment-driven mobilization and the expressive nature of the communication are key to understanding how media and society shape each other in contemporary political environments.
